![]() ![]() Our analysis was written in the well-established tradition of macro-quantitative and time series development research. Our research also uses myriads of cross-national development data, made freely available online in EXCEL format at. For the analysis of Antisemitism, we rely on the ADL (2014) ADL-100 study by the Anti-Defamation League of Antisemitism in more than 100 countries. For global opinion comparisons, we used the freely available PEW Spring 2018 Survey of the PEW Institute in Washington, D.C. Our used data sources are the best available opinion surveys on the Arab countries in the world today, i.e., the Arab Opinion Index of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar the Arab Barometer, and the World Values Survey. We mention the methodologies and data in the order of their occurrence in the present book. In this chapter, we debate the data sources of our analysis and the statistical methods used. The long-term influence of new media on regime support in authoritarian nations should be explored in further research. We conclude that the applicability of the exposure-acceptance model may have declined in China due to the rise of new media. Therefore, we introduce the measure of new media usage into Kennedy’s models and find a linear negative effect on regime support at the national level. New media can affect people’s media exposure patterns in a way that goes beyond the scope of the exposure-acceptance model. This inconsistency may stem from the explosive growth of new media in China over the past 20 years, which has made criticism more accessible. ![]() The results fail to support the exposure-acceptance model in either the rural or the urban subsample. Has this changed the patterns of regime support? To revisit this question, we replicate Kennedy’s analyses using the WVS 2018 data. In the past two decades, China has narrowed this gap. He attributed this phenomenon to the “urban–rural gap” in educational opportunities in China. With reference to the country’s Fourth Republic, the paper highlights the critical implications of such an anomalous culture for Nigeria’s democratic aspirations and governance experience, noting that radical civic re-orientation is a desideratum for any change to the status quo.īased on the China data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 2000, Kennedy found a significant curvilinear relationship between education and regime support in the rural subsample but not in the urban subsample, partially verifying the exposure-acceptance model. The paper posits that Nigerian’s democratic prospects have been undermined by its persistent undemocratic political culture. The descriptive qualitative analysis focuses on salient aspects of democratic culture. This paper explores some contemporary issues of democracy and governance in Nigeria from the standpoint of the country’s prevailing undemocratic political culture. While electoral democracy is universally acclaimed as the quintessence of good governance, Nigeria’s democratic experience has been apparently contradictory. Since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, the quest to sustain and mainstream democratic practice and governance has continued to play a vital role in the country’s political life. Thus the differences in support for democratic values between ethnic groups within countries are far from just a random phenomenon. Of 259 paired comparisons between the majority and minority groups within the 16 countries on the 10 indicators, by chance alone we should find only about 15 statistically significant differences instead, we find 134. Ethnic differences within countries on these indicators are often far larger than the aggregate differences between countries. We test for ethnic differences on 10 democratic values in 16 WVS countries from 1990-93. In particular, given the close conceptual link between culture and ethnicity (whether measured by ethnic attachment, religion, race, or language), we propose to examine how often differences in political values are linked to ethnic differences. We question whether the most appropriate unit of aggregation for the study of subjective political culture is the country or some other significant unit. This article focuses on the measurement of political values, raising both theoretical and technical objections to how survey data like the WVS have been used to characterize political culture. No previous analysis of the WVS has examined value differences associated with a common source of social cleavage: ethnicity. Comparative studies of mass political culture based on surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), typically leap to using aggregate-level statistics for the entire population of a country.
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